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STATE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES FOR GENDER VIOLENCE: 
A TOOL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Julie Goldscheid & Rene Kathawala* 
This article focuses attention on state civil rights remedies that 
provide a civil cause of action against those who commit acts of gender-
based violence and frame the harm as a violation of the survivor’s civil 
rights. Though many of these laws long have been on the books, they are 
not widely used. The #MeToo movement has rightly focused public 
attention on the ways gender violence persists and on the gaps in legal 
remedies for survivors. While law and policy-makers work to enact new 
laws to fill gaps, existing laws should be invoked to promote 
accountability and provide redress for survivors. State and local civil 
rights remedies do just that. 
In 1994, after four years of hearings, Congress enacted a civil rights 
remedy as part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (“VAWA 
Civil Rights Remedy”), which provided a private right of action against 
an individual who commits an act of gender violence. The law was 
modeled after other federal civil rights legislation and authorized a 
survivor of gender-motivated violence to bring a civil cause of action 
against the individual who committed the harm. The Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), struck down the federal 
law as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
powers and of Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While the law provided redress for survivors during the six 
years it was in effect, both preexisting and later-enacted state and local 
remedies also provide a private right of action for gender violence as a 
civil rights violation. This article reviews those state and local statutes 
and the associated case law interpreting them. It demonstrates that 
those state and local laws can be more widely used by individuals who 
 
* Julie Goldscheid is a Professor of Law at CUNY Law School. Rene Kathawala is pro bono counsel for 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. Rene’s firm is provided only for identification purposes, and this 
article does not set forth the views of Orrick or its clients. We acknowledge the following current and 
former Orrick attorneys who participated in the research and analysis that forms the backbone of this 
essay: David A. Avila, Kristin S. Cornuelle, Lauri A. Damrell, Jessica R. L. James, Elena Kamenir, 
Ayanna Lewis-Gruss, Susan Patricia Long, Shaila Rahman Diwan, and Evgeniya Shakina. In addition, 
thanks to Nishat Tabassum, CUNY Law 2019 and Nishan Bhaumik, CUNY Law 2015, for their helpful 
research assistance. We also thank Carrie Bettinger Lopez for inspiring this research project.  
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seek to hold those who commit acts of gender violence accountable.  
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, when high-profile and high-
net-worth individuals are being held to account, and when reports of 
sexual violence that occurs outside traditional employment settings are 
capturing public attention, those laws may be of increased utility. 
Employment trends leaving fewer workers employed in settings covered 
by traditional federal and state anti-discrimination laws expose the gaps 
in existing civil rights frameworks and render additional remedies all 
the more important. The state laws reviewed here have not been the 
focus of much advocacy, scholarship, or litigation. This article advances 
an additional and under-utilized theory of recovery for gender violence 
survivors that promotes the principles of equality and liberty for which 
civil rights long has stood. 
INTRODUCTION 
The current attention to gender violence raises important and 
challenging questions about the power and limits of the law and about 
how law and culture interact to produce social change. This moment of 
outrage and activism follows over 30 years of advocacy that has 
generated a body of federal and state laws, policies, and practices aimed 
at prohibiting and providing redress for gender violence. The moment 
highlights how deeply gender violence is engrained in our culture and 
serves as a reminder that cultural norms have persisted in allowing 
gender violence to continue, unmitigated, for years. It provides an 
opportunity to consider new ways to challenge cultural norms and to 
critically assess how the law can better promote accountability and 
provide redress for those who suffer sexual violence and other forms of 
gender-related abuse. 
Legal remedies are but one tool to address gender violence; they are 
by definition limited in their ability to produce deep cultural change. But 
law reform remains important as a tool for accountability, as a prod for 
policy change, and as a means for redress for those harmed as a result. 
Law reform addressing gender violence advanced significantly when the 
Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of workplace 
discrimination in 1986.1 However, federal antidiscrimination laws do 
not reach all employers,2 do not hold the individuals who commit sexual 
violence directly accountable,3 and case law has limited the scope of 
 
 1. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (“The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”). 
 3. See Julie Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34 Fla. 
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discrimination claims even for employers within its reach.4 
Significantly, as discussed more fully below, the Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Morrison, invalidated the civil rights remedy enacted as 
part of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”); that 
provision provided a private cause of action against the person who 
committed an act of gender-motivated violence.5 
Much of the #MeToo movement’s focus has been directed at the 
workplace. At the same time, advocates and policymakers know that 
sexual harassment at work is but one form of gender violence. Gender 
violence is also prevalent in schools, in public spaces, and in intimate 
partner relationships that have no relationship to the workplace.6 Indeed, 
many of the high-profile cases recently calling attention to the 
persistence of gender violence fall outside the purview of traditional 
civil rights laws, which apply primarily to the workplace, to housing, to 
educational institutions, and to state actors.7 In response to the #MeToo 
 
St. U. L. Rev. 731, 747 n. 68 (2007); Maya Raghu & JoAnna Suriani, National Women’s Law Center, 
#MeTooWhatNext: Strengthening Workplace Sexual Harassment Protections and Accountability, at 3 
(last visited July 21, 2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/metoowhatnext-strengthening-workplace-sexual-
harassment-protections-and-accountability/ (detailing shortfalls in the law and recommended reform). 
 4. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013) (holding that an employee is a 
“supervisor,” and therefore may be vicariously liable for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 only if she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions 
against the victim). For discussion of Title VII’s limitations in redressing sexual harassment on the job, 
see, e.g., Rebecca H. White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE (2018), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164487 (last visited July 21, 2018).  
 5. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 6. See, e.g., Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar sentenced to up to 175 years in prison for decades of 
sexual abuse, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/larry-nassar-sentencing/index.html (detailing sexual 
abuse by former USA Gymnastics and Michigan State University doctor) (last visited July 21, 2018); 
Olivia Fleming, Models Share Stories of Sexual Assault in the Fashion Industry, 
http://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a12817440/models-sexual-assault-stories-fashion-
industry/ (detailing sexual assault of models and noting that models generally are considered 
independent contractors and therefore outside of the reach of most workplace antidiscrimination laws) 
(last visited July 21, 2018); Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, The 
Silence Breakers, TIME Magazine, Person of the Year 2017, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-
2017-silence-breakers/?xid=homepage (celebrating survivors who have come forward) (last visited July 
21, 2018); Helen Rosner, The Moral Responsibility of Restaurant Critics in the Age of #MeToo, The 
New Yorker (Feb. 15, 2018) https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-gastronomy/the-role-of-the-
restaurant-critic-in-the-age-of-metoo; Kate Rogers, #MeToo on Main Street: Small businesses can’t 
overlook workplace harassment, CNBC, Make It (Feb. 21, 2018) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/21/metoo-on-main-street-small-businesses-fire-suspend-
employees.html, Feb. 21, 2018. See also, e.g., Lesley Wexler, Jennifer Robbennolt, & Colleen Murphy, 
#MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, (March 6, 2018), University of Illinois College of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-14, at notes 2 – 38, and accompanying text, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135442 (reviewing allegations, including, inter alia, those brought against 
individuals in industries including politics, entertainment and media, chefs and restaurateurs, venture 
capital, academia and the judiciary). 
 7. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2018) [hereinafter Title 
VII]; Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (“Title VI”) (2018) 
(prohibiting race discrimination in programs or activities that receive federal funds); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et 
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movement, advocates have proposed a number of important reforms to 
address gaps in the law, many of which are focused on the workplace.8 
As policymakers assess gaps in the law, proposals should take into 
account the range of contexts in which gender violence occurs. This 
essay focuses on laws framing gender violence as a civil rights violation 
and, specifically, on laws that would hold the individual who committed 
the harm accountable. While proposals to amend workplace 
discrimination laws to more fully cover the harms of discriminatory 
harassment at work would go a long way toward advancing workplace 
accountability, free standing civil rights laws apply regardless of an 
employment context. If part of the goal of legal remedies is to promote 
accountability by those who commit harm, individual accountability 
should be a core component of a comprehensive liability scheme.  
In 1994, after four years of hearings, Congress enacted a civil rights 
remedy as part of the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a 
private right of action against an individual who committed an act of 
gender violence.9 The law was modeled after other federal civil rights 
legislation that addressed analogous harms.10 The Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Morrison, struck down the federal law as an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers and of 
 
seq. (2018) (“Title IX”) (prohibiting sex discrimination in education programs or activities that receive 
federal financial assistance); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) [hereinafter Section 1983] (providing cause of 
action for violations of constitutional or federal law by state actors).  
 8. For example, proposals include expanding Title VII to include small businesses, to allow 
independent contractors to sue, to hold employers accountable for harassment by a low-level supervisor, 
to address secrecy in a variety of forms, and to hold individuals accountable. See, e.g., Raghu & Suriani, 
supra note 3 (detailing shortfalls in the law and recommended reform); Margaret E. Johnson, Only 1 in 
4 women who have been sexually harassed tell their employers. Here’s why they’re afraid, THE 
CONVERSATION (June 5, 2018), http://theconversation.com/only-1-in-4-women-who-have-been-
sexually-harassed-tell-their-employers-heres-why-theyre-afraid-97436. 
 9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 
1902, 1941-42 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by Morrison, supra note 
5, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful 
Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 123, 128-180 (1999) [hereinafter 
Meaningful Paradigm]. For accounts of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy’s legislative history, see, e.g., 
Sally Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of 
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 64 – 78 (2002); Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the 
Persistence of Privacy, 102 Ohio St. L. J. 1 (2000); Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, 
and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 
1-2 (1996); Fred Strebeigh, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 309-445 (2009). 
 10. For summaries of the law’s purpose and history, see, e.g., supra note 9; for additional 
commentary, see, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 
(2000); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 619 
(2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441 (2000); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, 
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002); Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3; Julie 
Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not 
Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L. Q. 157, 158 (2005) [hereinafter, Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out].  
4
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Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.11 
However, both preexisting and later-enacted state and local remedies 
provide a private right of action for gender violence as a civil rights 
violation. This article updates a review of those laws published in 
2005,12 and argues that these state laws can be more widely used by 
individuals who seek to hold those who commit acts of gender violence 
accountable through civil remedies.  
Part I provides a background of the 1994 federal civil rights remedy 
and of subsequent efforts to introduce a revised federal remedy after the 
United States v. Morrison decision. Part II reviews the state statutes 
providing civil remedies for gender violence and their associated case 
law. This article concludes with recommendations about how these laws 
can be used to promote accountability and provide redress for survivors, 
as part of the current wave of efforts to end gender violence. 
I. Background: The Federal Civil Rights Remedy and Its Aftermath 
Since the purpose, history, and use of the VAWA Civil Rights 
Remedy has been well documented elsewhere,13 this section will offer 
only a brief summary. The law was intended to complement 
Reconstruction-era and other civil rights statutes by providing a civil 
cause of action for other forms of discrimination and bias-motivated 
violence, in order to provide a uniform federal law framing gender 
violence as a civil rights violation.14 Existing laws would provide at 
least some measure of redress for gender violence committed at work,15 
committed by state actors,16 or committed by groups of individuals.17 
Notwithstanding the formidable limitations of the reach of those laws, 
advocates and Congress recognized that no federal law provided a 
federal civil rights cause of action for the most common form of gender 
violence, that committed by private individuals.18 The goals can be 
thought of as two-fold: as a practical tool that would provide a cause of 
action for survivors, and as an aspirational, or symbolic remedy that 
would more accurately capture the nature of the harm. This re-framing 
would transform the terms of debate, would bring public attention to its 
 
 11. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 12. Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10. See also, e.g., Andrea Brenneke, 
Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 Law & Ineq. 1, 39-43 (1992) 
(discussing state civil rights remedies for gender violence). 
 13. See, e.g., supra notes 9 and 10. 
 14. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 72-73. 
 15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2018) [hereinafter Title VII]. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (2018). 
 18. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 72-73. 
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severity and impact, and would counter the historic gender 
subordination that fuels and perpetuates abuse.19 
The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, as enacted, provided a private 
right of action for a “crime of violence” that was “gender-motivated.”20 
It made clear that a claim would not be dependent on any associated 
criminal proceeding and would apply regardless of the relationship 
between the parties.21 During the six years the law was in effect, over 60 
reported decisions invoked the law.22 The legislative history of the 
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy directed courts to analyze the two-part 
“gender-motivation” requirement in the same way it would assess bias 
in other civil rights statutes, by evaluating the “totality of the 
circumstances” for evidence such as epithets, patterns of behavior, 
statements evincing bias, and other circumstantial as well as direct 
evidence.23 Despite concerns before its enactment that the statutory 
definitions would preclude relief, most courts recognized that claims 
alleging domestic violence and sexual assault satisfied the statutory 
elements.24  
Nevertheless, challenges to the law’s constitutionality proved 
successful, and the Supreme Court struck down the law in United States 
v. Morrison.25 The Court deemed the law beyond Congress’ powers 
under both the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.26 Following that decision, proposals were introduced in 
Congress that would retain the essence of the private right of action but 
would include a “jurisdictional element” that would require proof of 
economic impact in each case, to address the Morrison Court’s concerns 
 
 19. See, e.g., Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3 at 743-45; Goldscheid, Struck 
Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10, at 160-65. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), (d)(1) - (2) (1994), overruled by U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). The statute contained a two-part definition of the term "crime of violence,” under which the 
plaintiff first would have to establish that the "act or series of acts . . . would constitute a felony against 
the person" or "against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another," 42 
U.S.C. § 13981 (d)(2)(A); and that the act came within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994), which is a 
federal statute defining “crime of violence.” To establish the “gender motivat[ion]” element, a plaintiff 
would have to prove that the act was committed “because of gender or on the basis of gender,” and 
“due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994) 
(subsequently repealed). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) & (2). 
 22. See, e.g., Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10, at 164-65; Julie 
Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Bias Crimes – Charting New 
Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 265, 271-83 (2001) (reviewing decisions, 
including those interpreting the “crime of violence” and “gender motivation” elements, respectively).  
 23. See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52-53, 64 (1993); see also, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Gender-
Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 Harv. 
Women’s L.J. 123, 130, 142-48 (1999); Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 271-73. 
 24. Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 261, 271-83. 
 25. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 26. Id. at 617, 627. 
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that the 1994 remedy, as written, reached beyond Congress’ Commerce 
Clause powers.27 That proposal did not advance in Congress.28 
The Morrison Court invited local responses. As Justice Rehnquist 
opined:  
 
. . . If the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice 
could fail to provide [Christy Brzonkala] a remedy for the 
conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system 
that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
and not by the United States.29  
 
It further opined that it could: 
 
. . . think of no better example of the police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the 
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its 
victims.30 
 
Indeed, a few jurisdictions took up the Court’s invitation to enact 
state and local laws.31 California, Illinois, New York City, and 
Westchester enacted state and local civil rights remedies modeled after 
the federal law.32 However, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy was not 
the first legislative enactment to frame gender violence as a civil rights 
violation. State civil rights remedies, many of which were on the books 
before VAWA’s enactment, provide civil relief for gender-motivated 
violence. Some of those laws are freestanding, and some are linked to 
states’ bias crime or civil rights statutes.33 Nevertheless, those laws have 
not been widely publicized or widely used.  
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, when high-profile and high-
 
 27. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2000, H.R. 5021, 106th 
Cong. (2000). 
 28. Nothing would preclude reintroduction of the Violence Against Women Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 2000 or a modified version of a similar law. The scope and utility of such a proposal 
is beyond the scope of this essay. 
 29. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
 30. Id. at 618. 
 31. See Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10, at 165. 
 32. Id. at note 45 (citing Cal. Civil Code § 52.4 (West 2004); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 82/10 
(West 2004); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-901 (2000); Westchester County, NY, Laws of Westchester 
County ch. 701 (2001), and noting that New York City’s City Council expressly referenced the 
Morrison decision in its legislative findings stating that it enacted this law “[i]n light of the void left by 
the Supreme Court’s decision,” to ensure that victims had an “officially sanctioned and legitimate cause 
of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from gender-motivated violence.” N.Y.C. Admin. 
Code § 8-902 (2000)). 
 33. For a review of those laws as of 2005, see, e.g., Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 
supra note 10. See also infra Section II.B. 
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net-worth individuals are being held to account, and when reports of 
sexual violence that occur outside traditional employment settings are 
capturing public attention, those laws may be of increased utility. 
Employment trends leaving fewer workers employed in settings covered 
by traditional federal and state antidiscrimination laws expose gaps in 
existing civil rights frameworks and render additional remedies all the 
more important.34  
II. Survey of State Civil Rights Remedies  
State civil rights remedies providing a private cause of action against 
someone who has committed an act of gender-motivated violence take 
several different approaches. They can roughly be categorized as 
follows: (1) laws enacted after United States v. Morrison, which track 
the general structure of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy; and (2) civil 
remedies provided as part of or in connection with the state’s civil rights 
laws, which are framed as: (a) those providing a civil cause of action for 
bias-motivated violence or intimidation based on a protected category, 
including “sex” or “gender;” and (b) those providing a civil cause of 
action for interference with other state or federal rights, which include 
the right to be free from gender-based violence.35 This section will 
discuss each in turn.36  
A. Post-Morrison Provisions Modeled on VAWA Civil Rights 
Remedy37  
1. California 
California’s anti-gender violence statute, enacted in response to the 
Morrison decision, provides redress virtually identical to the prior 
 
 34. See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, Freelanced: The Rise of the Contract Workforce, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/578825135/rise-of-the-contract-workers-work-is-different-now, NPR 
(Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing NPR/Marist poll finding that one in five jobs in America is held by a worker 
under contract). 
 35. This review of state laws includes those that apply to gender violence committed at work or 
in educational institutions, but that are not limited to those settings. It does not survey the statutory 
frameworks available in every state specifically providing redress for sex discrimination, including 
sexual harassment and assault, at work or in educational institutions. Although some of those 
employment discrimination statutes allow for individual liability, their main focus is on institutional, not 
individual, accountability. 
 36. In addition, see the attached Appendix A, listing each state’s statute with the associated 
citation, for easy reference. 
 37. In addition to the statutes discussed below, Minnesota’s statute providing a civil remedy for 
bias-motivated violence tracks the structure of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, even though it was 
enacted while VAWA was still in effect. See infra notes 132 to 135 and accompanying text. 
8
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VAWA remedy. The statute affords a right of action for victims of 
gender violence and authorizes recovery of damages, injunctive relief, 
and related attorney fees in a civil suit against the individual who 
committed harm.38 Though the case law interpreting this statute is 
limited, it provides some insight into how courts may interpret the 
statutory requirements.39 The statute sets out two alternative bases for 
establishing a claim: either (1) a criminal offense involving the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force where the offense was 
committed, at least in part, based on the gender of the victim; or (2) the 
physical intrusion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions.40 A few 
decisions have interpreted the first definition, in which claims would be 
based on an underlying criminal offense with physical force that is 
based in part on gender animus. In F.P. v. Monier, the California 
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s judgment that the plaintiff had 
alleged the requisite criminal offense.41 The decision was based on 
numerous allegations, including that the 17-year old defendant had 
molested plaintiff numerous times when she was 10 years old and that 
he committed acts of unlawful penetration, sodomy, and oral 
copulation.42  
Neither of the two other reported decisions analyzing this element 
found it to be satisfied. In Harper v. Lugbauer, the plaintiff alleged that 
 
 38. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4 (2002). The statute defines “gender” to mean sex and also includes a 
person’s gender identity and gender expression. “Gender expression” means a person’s gender-related 
appearance and behavior, whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at 
birth. The statute defines gender violence as a form of sex discrimination and specifies that a claim be 
based on either (1) one or more acts that would constitute a criminal offense under state law that has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force where the offense was committed, 
at least in part, based on the gender of the victim; or (2) the physical intrusion of a sexual nature under 
coercive conditions. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4(c). Victims of gender violence may file a claim in either 
superior court or small claims court within three years of the offense (or for minors, the latter of eight 
years after the date of majority, or three years from the date that the plaintiff discovers or should have 
discovered the related injury after reaching majority). The statute also explicitly precludes employer 
vicarious liability for the actions of their employees. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4. This enactment 
complements other bias-crime-related legislation already in effect in California. See infra Section 
II.B.I.a.  
 39. In a noteworthy decision covering the right of a survivor to bring a gender violence claim in 
court, though not interpreting the substantive terms of the civil rights statute, a California appellate court 
held that an arbitration agreement covering “any dispute” between a nurse recruiting company and 
hospital company arising “out of the services contracted for in” the nurse recruitment contract did not 
cover claims by the recruiting company and its chief executive officer against the hospital company and 
its vice president for gender-based violence, gender violence, assault, and false imprisonment, arising 
from the employees’ intimate relationship; possibility of alleged domestic assault by employee of one 
company against employee of the other could not have been within parties’ contemplation at the time of 
the agreement, even if it would not have occurred but for the business relationship between companies. 
RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West, Cal.Rptr.3d 892 (App. 1 Dist. 2008).   
 40. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4 (2002).  
 41. F.P. v. Monier, 3 Cal. 5th 1099, 1115 (Cal. 2017). 
 42. Id. 
9
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several defendants, including some of her neighbors and various city 
employees, engaged in a criminal conspiracy to sexually assault and 
rape the plaintiff, which had occurred many years earlier.43 The court 
analyzed the web of defendants and found that the plaintiff did not 
provide any evidence tying defendants’ unflattering statements about her 
to any genuine issue of fact evincing an agreement by the defendants to 
commit any act defined by the statute.44 The court ruled that there were 
insufficient facts to establish an underlying criminal conspiracy and, 
therefore, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.45  
Similarly, in Greenwald v. Bohemian Club, Inc., the plaintiff, a cook 
at a private club, alleged three criminal offenses based on a purported 
sexual assault and subsequent harassment by the club’s director of 
human resources and harassment by other employees.46 The court 
dismissed her sexual assault and battery allegations because they fell 
outside of the three-year statute of limitations.47 The court concluded 
that the remaining allegation, defendant’s threat to overload the 
plaintiff’s work schedule if she filed a complaint, did not satisfy the 
statutory requirement of a gender-motivated criminal offense with 
physical force.48  
With respect to the second means of establishing a claim, courts have 
upheld claims based on allegations of physical invasions of a sexual 
nature that occurred under coercive conditions, regardless of a particular 
showing of gender animus. This showing was established under the 
particularly appalling facts presented in F.P. v. Monier, discussed 
above.49 Similarly, a California court found a triable issue of fact as to 
whether a supervisor coerced the plaintiff into committing sexual acts in 
Doe v. Starbucks, Inc.50 There, the minor plaintiff was a barista at a local 
Starbucks and claimed that her shift supervisor coerced her into having 
repeated sexual encounters with him. The plaintiff alleged that her 
supervisor repeatedly asked her out and that she finally said “yes” to 
make him stop asking.51 Her supervisor kept demanding sexual favors 
and the plaintiff complied because she felt she had to or she would lose 
 
 43. Harper v. Lugbauer, No. 11-CV-01306-JST, 2014 WL 1266305, at *17-19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
21, 2014). 
 44. Id. at *17.  
 45. Id. at *18-20. 
 46. Greenwald v. Bohemian Club, Inc., No. C07-05261 WHA, 2008 WL 2331947, at *1, 4, 5 
(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. See supra note 39, at 1085. 
 50. Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG CWX, 2009 WL 5183773, at *1, 4-5 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). 
 51. Id. at *4-5.  
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her job.52 Their encounters continued for months and, when a coworker 
asked the plaintiff about it, her supervisor yelled at the plaintiff for 
confirming it and claimed there was no coercion.53 The court denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and the case was later settled out of 
court.54 Two additional decisions included Section 52.4 claims based on 
coercive sexual intrusion, but the reported decisions did not address the 
Section 52.4 claim.55 
2. Illinois 
The Illinois Gender Violence Act (“IGVA”), enacted in 2004, 
provides a private civil cause of action for any person who has been 
subjected to “gender-related violence.”56 Although there is not a large 
body of case law, a few decisions arose from workplace-related 
harassment and a few involved assaults by medical professionals. For 
example, in Smith v. Farmstand, the court affirmed a jury verdict for a 
male former butcher who sued his former employer and other employees 
for race and sex discrimination.57 His IGVA claims against two 
employees were based on testimony involving allegations of 
 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at *5.  
 54. Id. at *17.  
 55. See Kelly v. Cty. of Santa Clara, No. C 04-03676 JW, 2005 WL 588569, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 15, 2005) (plaintiff, who was walking her dog, alleged that police officer ordered her to secure her 
dog, hit her from behind, arrested her, and placed her in the back seat of his car where he put his hands 
between her thighs and on her breast; defendant moved to dismiss the federal Section 1983 claim and 
negligence tort claims and case settled out of court.); Grimes v. Knife River Const., No. CIV. S-13-
02225 KJM, 2014 WL 1883812, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2014) (plaintiff alleged that her supervisor 
had subjected her to sexual harassment, ranging from inappropriate sexual comments to sexual contact, 
accompanied by threats to dissuade her from reporting his behavior; reported decision addressed 
procedural issues and the case was settled before trial.). 
 56. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 82/1 (2004), et seq. The IGVA authorizes an award of “damages, 
injunctive relief, or other appropriate relief against a person or persons perpetrating” the gender-related 
violence. Id. § 82/10. The term “gender-related violence” is defined in the IGVA as: (1) one or more 
acts of violence or physical aggression satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of Illinois that 
are committed, at least in part, on the basis of a person’s sex, whether or not those acts have resulted in 
criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction; (2) a physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual 
nature under coercive conditions satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of Illinois, whether or 
not the act or acts resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction; or (3) a threat of an act 
described in item (1) or (2) causing a realistic apprehension that the originator of the threat will commit 
the act. Id. § 82/5. Under Illinois law, “perpetrated” is defined to include “either personally committing 
[,] . . . encouraging or assisting” an act of gender-related violence. Id. § 82/10. “Battery” is interpreted to 
simply include the unauthorized touching of another person. Luss v. Vill. of Forest Park, 377 Ill. App. 
3d 318, 331, 878 N.E.2d 1193, 1204 (2007). Accordingly, it appears that any type of direct, assisted, or 
encouraged gender-based violence involving physical contact is a battery falling within the purview of 
the IGVA.  
 57. Smith v. Farmstand, No. 11-CV-9147, 2016 WL 5912886, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016) 
(claim involving harassment by a man of a male). 
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inappropriate touching of a sexual nature.58 Similarly, a federal district 
court in Zamudio v. Nick & Howard LLC denied an employer’s motion 
to dismiss IGVA claims based on allegations that “going up the skirts of 
female employees was [Defendant’s] preferred method of harassment,” 
and that other female employees were subjected to similar lewd 
touching and unwelcome sexual advances.59 
Other decisions involve sexual assaults by medical professionals. In 
Flores v. Santiago, an appellate court upheld plaintiff’s claims for 
common law battery and violation of the IGVA based on allegations that 
during her visits to the defendant doctor’s office, he doped her with 
narcotics and engaged in sexual relations.60 Similarly, in Johnson v. 
David, the court upheld an IGVA claim based on allegations that the 
pre-employment physical exam to which the plaintiff was subjected was 
substantially different than what was required, specifically, “because the 
penile portion of the examination was not a necessary part of the 
examination and did not relate to anything a correctional officer would 
be doing in his line of work.”61  
Other decisions confirm that the term “person” under the IGVA is 
limited to natural persons, meaning that the IGVA does not apply to 
corporations and that a cause of action may only be brought against an 
“individual human being.”62 In Doe ex rel. Smith v. Sobeck, the guardian 
of a developmentally disabled female participant in a developmental 
training program brought an action against the program’s management 
under the IGVA and other federal and state laws.63 The complaint 
alleged that the program’s management had failed to separate and 
protect the female participant from the advances and ultimate rape 
committed by a male participant in the program.64 After noting that the 
IGVA does not apply to corporations, the court reasoned that a claim 
could be alleged against the individual managers if they “personally 
encouraged or assisted” in an act of gender-related violence, but that 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Zamudio v. Nick & Howard LLC, No. 15 C 3917, 2015 WL 6736679, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
4, 2015). 
 60. Flores v. Santiago, 986 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 6, (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 61. Johnson v. David, No. 12-CV-1038-SCW, 2017 WL 1090811, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 
2017). 
 62. See Doe v. Freeburg Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 70, No. 14-CV-674-NJR-DGW, 2015 WL 
3896960, at *4 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2015) (“The context surrounding the word ‘person’ in the Gender 
Violence Act is sufficient to overcome the presumption under the Statute on Statutes that the term 
‘person’ includes corporations.”); Fuesting v. Uline, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(internal quotations omitted); Doe ex rel. Smith v. Sobeck, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1026-1027 (S.D. Ill. 
2013). 
 63. 941 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. Ill. 2013). 
 64. Id. at 1021-1022.  
12
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plaintiff had failed to plead such a claim.65 
3. New York City 
In 2000, the New York City Council unanimously passed its Victims 
of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act (“GMVA”) to address 
“the void” left in light of the Morrison decision.66 In significant ways, 
the GMVA goes further than the civil remedy created as part of the 1994 
VAWA. For example, it grants a longer statute of limitations (seven 
years compared to VAWA’s four).67 It defines a crime of violence to 
include misdemeanors (as defined by state or federal law) as well as 
felonies.68 Additionally, the GMVA, like other state and local remedies, 
allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees and punitive damages, which are 
not typically available in tort claims under New York law.69  
Nevertheless, limited case law interprets the GMVA.70 The first 
substantive ruling was handed down about two years after it was 
enacted, in Cadiz-Jones v. Zambretti.71 The decision was notable in that 
it allowed for pending cases under the VAWA civil cause of action to be 
continued in state court by interpreting the GMVA to be applicable 
retroactively.72 Since then, at least one case differentiated VAWA Civil 
Rights Remedy cases that were pending when Morrison was decided, 
such as Cadiz-Jones, from other cases where the alleged conduct 
occurred prior to the enactment of Local Law 73, but where no VAWA 
civil rights claims were pending..73  
More recently, a trial court questioned the GMVA’s seven-year 
statute of limitations, which was heralded at the act’s passage as crucial 
 
 65. Id. at 1027-28.  
 66. NYC Administrative Code § 8-902 (2000) (declaring legislative intent). The law, NYC 
Administrative Code § 8-901 et seq. (2000) [hereinafter “GMVA”], provides for a civil cause of action 
for “any person claiming to be injured by an individual who commits a crime of violence motivated by 
gender” and the relief provided includes: (1) compensatory and punitive damages; (2) injunctive and 
declaratory relief; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs; and (4) such other relief as a court may deem 
appropriate. See NYC Administrative Code § 8-904. Violence “motivated by gender” is defined as “a 
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an 
animus based on the victim’s gender.” See id. at § 8-903-b. 
 67. Id. at § 8-905-a. 
 68. Id. at § 8-903.  
 69. Id. at § 8-904(3) (authorizing recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs). See Local Domestic 
Violence Law Elicits Applause and Questions, 224 N.Y.L.J. p. 5 col. 6 (Dec. 15, 2000).  
 70. In addition to the decisions discussed below, the court in Cartright v. Lodge, No. 15-CV-
9939, 2017 WL 1194241 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017), granted a default judgment and assessed damages 
in a case based on allegations of violence and intimidation, including claims under the GMVA). 
 71. No. 123772/00, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2043, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 2002). 
 72. Id. at **7-8.  
 73. See Adams v. Jenkins, No. 115745/03, 2005 WL 6584554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005) 
(refusing to apply Local law 73 retroactively). 
13
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since “studies have shown that victims of domestic violence often are 
not able to share information regarding their injuries with others until 
years later.”74 In Cordero v. Epstein, an alleged child abuse victim 
brought claims under Local Law 73 along with other civil claims against 
the alleged perpetrator.75 The court dismissed the claim as untimely, 
finding that the City Council’s extension of the statute of limitations for 
certain intentional torts violated the preemption doctrine.76  
A decision in one case involving claims based on multiple allegations 
spanning a number of years and several states nevertheless dismissed the 
claims. In Gottwald v. Sebert, recording star, Kesha Rose Sebert 
(“Ke$ha”) brought claims against her recording company’s executive 
and his companies based on allegations of sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, and contractual violations.77 The court dismissed the Local 
Law 73 claims, all of which were based on actions that took place 
outside of New York City and which would have been time-barred 
under New York law.78 The court additionally opined that, “[a]lthough 
[defendant’s] alleged actions were directed to [plaintiff], who is female, 
the [counter claims] do not allege that defendant harbored animus 
toward women or was motivated by gender animus” when he allegedly 
behaved violently toward plaintiff.79 The court went on to state that 
“[e]very rape is not a gender-motivated bias crime,”80 though in so 
doing it appeared to reference New York State’s criminal bias crimes 
law rather than the VAWA civil rights remedy on which the New York 
City law was modeled. The court cited a number of general employment 
discrimination cases but not the extensive and analogous case law 
interpreting claims of sexual violence and harassment as sex 
discrimination.81 Moreover, it ignored the substantial legislative history 
discussing and case law interpreting, “gender-motivation” under the 
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy while it was in effect.82  
Two recent decisions interpreted the New York City law in claims 
that could be seen as spurred by the #MeToo movement. In Breest v. 
Haggis, a 26-year-old woman who worked as a freelance publicist for a 
company that hosts film premiers alleged that she was sexually assaulted 
 
 74. See Local Domestic Violence Law Elicits Applause and Question, 224 N.Y.L.J. p. 5 col. 6 
(Dec. 15, 2000).  
 75. 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 76. Id. at 730. 
 77. Gottwald v. Sebert, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 78. Id. at *9-10. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. See supra notes 22 to 24 (tracing decisions under the VAWA civil rights remedy and 
referencing legislative history). 
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by the defendant, who was a famous director, producer, and 
screenwriter.83 The judge rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss her 
GMVA claims and concluded that the allegations of sexual assault, of 
comments indicating “disrespect for women,” of the defendant’s 
“enjoyment of some level of violence [as] against women,” and lack of 
provocation or confusion sufficiently alleged “gender-motivation” as 
required by the statute.84  
By contrast, the Southern District of New York dismissed claims 
brought by a former Fox News correspondent against Fox and Charles 
Payne, one of its anchors, based on allegations of sexual assault, rape, 
sexual harassment, and other claims.85 With respect to the GMVA 
claims, the trial court concluded that the allegations failed to state any 
facts showing defendant’s “hostility based on gender” or any allegations 
that the defendant “harbored or expressed any animosity toward 
women.”86 In employing that reasoning, the court disregarded the City 
Council’s legislative history that the GMVA was enacted to fill the void 
left by Morrison.87 Additionally, it ignored the VAWA civil rights 
remedy’s extensive legislative history directing courts to interpret the 
“gender motivation” requirement in the same way it would assess bias in 
other civil rights statutes.88 That case law makes clear that the statutory 
language requiring “animus” was not to be equated with “malicious” 
motivation, but instead, confirms that “animus” requires “at least a 
purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex.”89 Congress 
explicitly rejected suggestions to require proof of “animosity;” instead, 
it sought, through the “animus” requirement, to dispel suggestions that 
disparate impact claims could be brought under the statute.90 Notably, 
defendants initially challenged the law’s constitutionality, which led 
Public Advocate Letitia James to call for the New York City’s 
Corporation Counsel to defend defendant Payne’s constitutional 
challenge to Local Law 73; after the Corporation Counsel sought to 
intervene to defend the law’s constitutionality, Mr. Payne announced his 
decision to drop his constitutional challenge, though he continues to 
defend himself on the merits.91  
 
 83. Breest v. Haggis, No. 161137/2017 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.) (Complaint) (on file with author). 
 84. Breest v. Haggist, No. 161137/2017 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Jul. 26, 2018) (transcript p. 71 line 12- p. 
73 line 7) (on file with author). 
 85. Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 86. Id. at 454-56. 
 87. See supra note 66 (referencing City Council’s legislative history). 
 88. See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52-53, 64 (1993); see also, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 9 at 130, 
142-48; Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 22 at 271-73.  
 89. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).  
 90. See NOURSE, supra note 9, at 29-33 (recounting legislative history). 
 91. See Kelly Mena, PA James Victory: City’s Victims Protection Law Upheld, KINGS COUNTY 
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4. Westchester County 
Following New York City’s lead, in 2001, the County of Westchester 
enacted a Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection act 
(“VGVP”)92 that is very similar to New York City’s Local Law 73, 
although unlike Local Law 73, the VGVP does not expressly provide for 
a longer statute of limitations. To date, there are no reported decisions 
interpreting the Westchester law.  
5. Rockland County 
Like New York City and Westchester County, Rockland County also 
enacted a civil rights remedy for gender violence, modeled after the 
federal law.93 In the sole publicly-available decision interpreting the law, 
a federal district court held that the law was not unconstitutionally 
vague.94 Critical to the court’s conclusion was the defendant’s failure to 
offer authority in support of his argument that gender animus, or 
motivation, cannot be determined as a factual matter.95 
B. Civil Remedies for Gender Violence in State Bias Crime 
Provisions 
State statutes providing a private right of action for bias-motivated 
violence often are part of the state’s civil rights laws. Those laws can 
roughly be grouped into two categories: (1) those framed in terms of 
civil remedies enacted as part of the state’s anti-bias crime provisions 
and civil rights statutes encompassing violence or intimidation 
motivated by “sex” or “gender;” and (2) those framed more generally in 
terms of civil remedies for damage resulting from violations of, or 
interfering with, state or federal rights. This section reviews those laws 
and the caselaw interpreting them. It does not address statutory 
provisions providing civil remedies for bias-motivated violence based 
on characteristics other than gender.96 Nor does it review laws providing 
 
POLITICS (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.kingscountypolitics.com/pa-james-victory-citys-victims-
protection-law-upheld/; see also Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-07093-WHP 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blic/document/X1Q6NTAUQ282?documentName=60.pdf&fm
t=pdf (withdrawing defendant’s constitutional challenge following City of New York’s request to 
intervene in support of the law’s constitutionality).  
 92. See Westchester County, NY., Code of Ordinances § 701.01 (2001). 
 93. Rockland County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 279-3 (2001). 
 94. See Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 6965719, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012).  
 95. Id. at *2-3. 
 96. Notably, a few states provide civil remedies as part of their bias-crime statutes for bias-
motivated violence based on protected characteristics, including race, color, gender identity and sexual 
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a criminal remedy or that authorize sentence enhancement for criminal 
prosecutions based on bias-motivated violence, even when the violence 
is based on gender.97 
1. Private right of action for gender-based violence or intimidation 
a. California 
In addition to and preceding the post-Morrison legislation discussed 
above,98 California law provides a civil remedy for bias-motivated 
violence as part of its “hate crime” law. In 1976, the California 
Legislature enacted the Ralph Act as Section 51.7 of its civil code, 
thereby providing civil redress for gender violence and also creating a 
new right to be free from violence.99 Approximately 50 written decisions 
consider gender bias-based claims under this statute; however, only a 
few decisions interpret the key statutory elements: (1) the act of 
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, and (2) whether the act 
was motivated by the victim’s identity in a listed protected class.  
A recent decision easily found that allegations of sexual abuse and 
rape satisfy both elements of the statute. In Roe v. California 
Department of Developmental Services, the court upheld the civil rights 
claims on behalf of a woman with developmental disabilities and mental 
illnesses who had been sexually assaulted by the “psychiatric 
 
orientation, but not sex or gender. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571c (2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.690 
(2014); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.155, 166.165 (2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-35(a) (2014).  
 97. For examples of statutes providing criminal penalties or sentence enhancements, but not civil 
remedies, for “hate crimes” based on sex or gender, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §41-1750(A)(3) (2018); 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-662 (1972); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2799.2 (2017); Md. Crim. Law Code § 10-304 
(2009); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.523 (2016); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 574.085 (2017); N.H. Stat. § 651:6 (2018); 
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 31-18B-3 (2007); N.D. Stat. § 12.1-14-04 (2017); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.014 
(2017); Wy. Stat. Ann. §6-9-102 (2001); see also, e.g., M.G.L.A. ch. 265 §39 (2014) (providing 
sentence enhancement for bias crimes based, inter alia, on gender identity and sexual orientation, but 
not “sex” or “gender”). 
 98. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 99. Cal. Civ. Code 51.7(a) (2015). The law provides, in pertinent part, that: “All persons within 
the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of 
violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of 
any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or position in a labor dispute, 
or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics. The 
identification in this subdivision of particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than 
restrictive.” Id. Section 51, subdivision (b) also provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this 
state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 
disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every 
kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code 51(b). A person aggrieved by a violation of the Ralph Act may bring a 
civil action within three years of the alleged act to recover actual damages, a civil penalty of $25,000, 
exemplary damages, and an award of attorney fees. Cal. Civ. Code 52(b).  
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technician” assigned to work with her in her residential facility.100 The 
court concluded that “rape is considered a ‘violent’ offense . . . 
regardless of whether the defendant employed physical force.”101 It 
dismissed arguments that the rape was not “because of gender” as “a 
silly argument,” citing Title VII and VAWA civil right remedy cases 
similarly recognizing sexual assault and rape as gender based crimes.102  
Courts analyzing other allegations of gender violence have parsed the 
elements more closely. For example, courts have found the first element 
satisfied where facts alleged violence or threats of violence. For 
example, in Winarto v. Toshiba America Electronics Components, Inc., 
a female employee brought a claim against her employer alleging gender 
violence on the basis that her coworker often kicked her, feigned kicking 
her, called her “chick,” said “I’m going to hurt you again, Chick,” 
messed up her hair claiming it was a “girl thing,” and grabbed 
handkerchiefs from her pocket.103 The court found that violence was 
committed where at least one instance of kicking was undisputed and 
where several more acts were alleged.104 Although the acts of violence 
in Winarto involved acts of kicking, the court confirmed: “there is no 
requirement that the violence be extreme or motivated by hate in the 
plain language of the sections, or in the cases construing them; there is 
also no requirement that the act constitute a crime.”105  
The Winarto court articulated a “reasonable person” standard for 
determining whether a plaintiff was intimidated by a threat of 
violence.106 There, the court found that the plaintiff was intimidated by a 
threat of violence from the fact that she was injured while trying to run 
away from the defendant after the defendant said, “Chick, you’d better 
walk faster or I am going to hurt you again.”107 The court also noted that 
after being exposed to the defendant’s acts of violence, it was reasonable 
for her to be intimidated by his later, less violent acts of invading her 
personal space and touching her.108  
Similarly, in Hern, the plaintiff claimed gender violence based on 
several incidents of her neighbor spitting in her direction, following her, 
telling her that he was “watching” her, and leaving decapitated rats on 
her patio.109 The court found that the jury was permitted to consider the 
 
 100. No. 16-cv-03745, 2017 WL 2311303 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017).  
 101. Id. at 9.  
 102. Id. at 10-11. 
 103. Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1290 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 104. Id. at 1289. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1290. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Hern v. McEllen, No. A125358, 2011 WL 2112538, *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 2011) 
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/5
2018] CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES FOR GENDER VIOLENCE 189 
 
defendant’s entire course of conduct as it relates to the plaintiff’s 
gender—it need not limit its consideration to acts that 
contemporaneously referenced plaintiff’s gender.110  
Notwithstanding the Winarto court’s caution, at least one court 
interpreted the case to require a threatened use of physical force in order 
to establish “intimidation by threat of violence.” In Greenwald, a former 
catering employee filed Section 51.7 gender violence claims alleging 
sexual harassment by her supervisor, based on allegations including: 
battery from an incident where her coworker rammed her with a serving 
cart; harassment based on management’s intentional duties to perform 
physically demanding tasks after knowing about a work-related injury; 
and harassment by her supervisor threatening to overload her work 
schedule.111 However, the statute of limitations had run on all claims 
except for those based on the supervisor’s threat to overload her work 
schedule, which the court found did not satisfy the statutory 
requirement.112  
Another court rejected a claim based on allegations that a landlord’s 
manager entered a tenant’s apartment and sniffed her underwear.113 The 
court rejected plaintiff’s contention that “a jury should decide whether 
they ‘could reasonably fear rape or other sexual attack by [the 
landlord’s] resident male manager’ as a result of his conduct.”114 The 
court found that although the defendant entered the apartment and 
sniffed her underwear, the defendant did not express any intention to 
inflict injury on plaintiffs or their property.115 The court ruled that 
“[t]here can be no ‘threat of violence’ without some expression of intent 
to injure or damage plaintiffs or their property.”116  
Similarly, a court rejected a claim where there was no indication of 
violence. In Gabrielle A., a married couple sued the county and 
individual social workers for claims including negligent supervision, 
hiring, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of their 
civil rights after their two children were detained while waiting for their 
juvenile dependency case to be transferred to a different venue.117 With 
respect to their civil rights claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs 
 
(finding evidence of intimidation by threat of violence when the defendant followed the plaintiff, 
warned her that he was “watching” her, and left a decapitated rat on her patio). 
 110. Id. at *4-5. 
 111. Greenwald v. Bohemian Club, Inc., No. C 07-05261 WHA, 2008 WL 2331947, *16 (N.D. 
Cal. June 4, 2008). 
 112. Id. at *25-26. 
 113. Ramirez v. Wong, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).  
 114. Id. at 1486.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1268, 1281 (Cal Ct. App. 2017).  
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offered no evidence to establish defendants discriminated against them 
and consequently dismissed their claims.118 
When examining the second element of motivation, courts have 
recognized circumstantial evidence to support claims that the defendant 
directed his actions based on the victim’s class-based identity. A single 
statement made during an incident may be enough. In Myers, the court 
determined that plaintiff’s testimony that a police officer’s reference to 
her as an “ugly white bitch” during an incident was sufficient evidence 
for a jury to conclude that race and sex were motivating factors for the 
police officer’s conduct.119  
In Hern, described above, the court found that a jury could have 
inferred that a neighbor’s repeated threatening interactions and 
demeaning gender-based comments confirmed that plaintiff’s gender 
was a principal motivation for his conduct.120 The court ruled that jurors 
could consider the defendant’s entire course of conduct towards a 
plaintiff, apart from the defendant’s conduct committed 
contemporaneously with the act.121 Similarly, in Winarto, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was reasonable to infer that gender 
was a motivating factor because it was undisputed that the defendant 
derisively called the plaintiff a “chick” and messed with her hair 
claiming that it was a “‘girl thing.’”122 Conversely, courts have rejected 
claims where the complaint contained only conclusory allegations of 
discriminatory prejudice.123  
b. Illinois 
The Illinois Hate Crime Act (“IHCA”) provides that, independent of 
any criminal prosecution, anyone suffering personal injury or property 
damage as a result of a bias crime may bring a civil suit for actual 
damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive 
relief.124 Thus, under the IHCA, a plaintiff states a civil claim if he or 
 
 118. Id. at 1291. 
 119. Myers v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 08-1163 MEJ, 2012 WL 4111912, *31 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 18, 2012).  
 120. Hern, supra note 109, at *14. 
 121. Id. at *12. 
 122. Winarto, supra note 103, at 1290. 
 123. See Sullivan v. City of San Rafael, No. C 12-1922 MEJ, 2012 WL 3236058, *9 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 6, 2012) (finding no claim where plaintiff did not plead any facts to support allegations that police 
officers were motivated by animus against the plaintiff’s homosexuality); Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 
819 F. Supp. 2d 937, 953 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that although the complaint alleged in conclusory 
manner that plaintiff was subjected to unreasonable force because of her “race and/or gender,” the 
complaint did not allege any facts to substantiate the claim). 
 124. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-7.1(c) (1995). See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann 12-7.1 (2018) for full 
text of civil provision of Illinois’ bias crime law. Courts interpreting the state’s bias crime law have held 
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she alleges injury from an assault or battery that was motivated because 
of his or her actual or perceived gender.125 No reported decisions apply 
the civil provision to gender-based violence claims.  
c. Iowa 
Iowa grants a civil remedy for gender violence that violates its bias 
crime statute.126 However, no reported decisions apply the civil 
provision to gender-based violence claims.127 
d. Michigan 
In Michigan, individuals who violate the state’s ethnic intimidation 
statute may be civilly liable to their victims.128 The statute encompasses 
bias crimes based on gender129 and can be brought “regardless of the 
existence or result of any criminal prosecution.”130 A gender violence 
survivor bringing a civil claim under Michigan’s ethnic intimidation 
statute may seek an injunction, actual damages (including damages for 
emotional distress), or other applicable relief.131 Despite the availability 
of a civil cause of action for gender-violence survivors, no reported 
decision addresses claims brought by such survivors under the ethnic 
intimidation statute. 
e. Minnesota 
In Minnesota, gender violence survivors have a civil cause of action 
 
that bias need not have been the sole motive for the conduct. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 674 N.E.2d 895, 
898 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (affirming battery conviction of white defendant who uttered racial slur, despite 
evidence that black victim had provoked the defendant); In re Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996).  
 125. Abdoh v. City of Chicago, 930 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  
 126. See Iowa Code Ann. § 729A.5 (1992). Accordingly, “[a] victim who has suffered physical, 
emotional, or financial harm as a result of a violation of this chapter due to the commission of a hate 
crime is entitled to and may bring an action for injunctive relief, general and special damages, 
reasonable attorney fees, and costs” within two years after the date of the violation. Id. Iowa’s bias 
crime statute provides that, inter alia, “[p]ersons within the state of Iowa have the right to be free from 
any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because 
of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or 
disability.” 
 127. Cf., e.g., Arrington ex rel. Arrington v. City of Davenport, 240 F. Supp. 2d 984, 993 (S.D. 
Iowa 2003) (granting summary judgment for defendants for civil claim under § 729A.5 alleging racially 
biased violence by police officer where court found no evidence of racial motivation). 
 128. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.147b(3) (2014). 
 129. Id. at § 750.147b (1). 
 130. Id. at § 750.147b (3). 
 131. Id. (the amount of damages may include both the greater of triple the actual damages or 
$2,000.00 and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs).  
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for damages against their aggressors under the state’s bias-offense 
statute.132 This statute, which was enacted before the Morrison decision, 
tracks the structure of the VAWA civil rights remedy, though it also 
encompasses civil claims for violence based on a number of protected 
categories in addition to “sex.”133 Survivors may bring civil claims 
regardless of whether a criminal proceeding was pursued.134 To prevail, 
a gender-violence survivor must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the aggressor’s violence constitutes a crime and that this 
violence was committed “because of” the survivor’s gender.135 Despite 
the availability of a civil cause of action for gender violence survivors, 
no reported decision addresses claims brought by such survivors under 
the bias-offense statute. 
f. Nebraska 
In Nebraska, individuals who violate the state’s discrimination-based 
offenses statute, which includes gender, may be civilly liable to their 
victims.136 Despite the availability of a civil cause of action for gender 
violence survivors, no Nebraska case law addresses claims brought by 
such survivors.137  
 
 132. The bias crime statute provides, inter alia, for a civil cause of action against those who 
committed a bias crime; it defines a “bias offense” as “conduct that would constitute a crime and was 
committed because of the victim’s or another’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, disability[,] . . . age, or national origin”; the statute authorizes compensatory damages, 
including emotional distress damages, as well as injunctive or other appropriate relief, and has a six-year 
statute of limitations. Minn. Stat. § 611A.79 (2014).  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at § 611A.79.3.  
 135. Id. at § 611A.79.1, .79.3. Cf., e.g., Disability Support All. v. Billman, No. 15-3649 
(JRT/SER), 2016 WL 755620, *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2016) (employment case dismissed where 
plaintiffs pleaded no facts suggesting that defendant’s “alleged conduct in violation of the ADA and the 
MHRA was committed because of [plaintiff’s] disability. The ‘because of’ language in the statute 
required plaintiffs to prove at least something about the defendant’s state of mind at the time he 
committed the act in question.”). 
 136. See Neb. Rev. St. § 28-113 (2014) (providing, inter alia, for general and special damages, 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence “that the 
defendant committed the criminal offense against the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property because of the 
plaintiff’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability or 
because of the plaintiff’s association with a person of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national 
origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability”; and providing a four-year statute of limitations). 
 137. Cf. State v. Duncan, 293 Neb. 359, 370-72 (2016) (phrase “because of,” in statute providing 
enhanced penalties for third-degree assault and other offenses committed because of a person’s 
association with a person of a certain sexual orientation requires state to prove that defendant would not 
have assaulted victim but for victim’s association with person of a certain sexual orientation, and 
evidence was sufficient to support verdict that defendant would not have assaulted victim but for 
victim’s association with people who were homosexual, as would support application of sentencing 
enhancement.). 
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g. New Jersey 
New Jersey’s bias crime law, enacted in 1993, authorizes a victim of 
gender violence to bring a civil lawsuit for damages against the 
perpetrator.138 The sole decision to address the law’s substantive 
elements is Hunt v. Callahan.139 The court affirmed the dismissal of an 
employment-based harassment claim after concluding that the plaintiff’s 
supervisor “did not use offensive language” and therefore did not intend 
to “intimidate” her based on her gender.140 In addition, the court opined 
that “[the supervisor] was merely voicing his opinion regarding acts he 
believed [the plaintiff] had engaged in and a political philosophy to 
which he believed she subscribed.”141 The only other reported decision 
addressing gender-based claims dismissed the “bias crime” allegations 
since the plaintiffs also brought claims under New Jersey’s Law Against 
Discrimination.142 
h. New York State 
In New York, individuals who commit bias-motivated violence may 
be civilly liable to their victims.143 Only one publicly-available case 
invokes this provision. In Friedlander v. Waroge Met. Ltd., a lesbian 
woman alleged that she was assaulted by a restaurant’s manager and 
patrons due to her perceived sexual and gender identities.144 No 
 
 138. N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-21(a) (2015) provides in relevant part that a “person, acting with purpose 
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of . . . gender [or] gender identity or 
expression . . . who engages in conduct that is an offense under [New Jersey’s criminal code] . . . 
commits a civil offense” and that “any person who sustains injury to person or property as a result of a 
violation” of the statute “shall have a cause of action against the person or persons who committed the 
civil offense resulting in the injury.” Id. at § 2A:53A-21(b). The statute requires proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence and allows for damages, including emotional distress damages, punitive 
damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at § 2A:53A-21(d)(1). The Attorney General for the State of 
New Jersey may bring a civil claim against any person who violates the law in addition to the 
survivor/victim. Id. at § 2A:53A-21(c). In addition, the law provides for “injunctive relief as the court 
may deem necessary to avoid the defendant’s continued violation.” Id. at § 2A:53A-21(d)(3). 
 139. Docket No. A-2780-11T3, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2458, at *10 (App. Div. Nov. 5, 
2012). 
 140. Id. at *10-11. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Massey, No. 07-3604 (PGS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23578, *20-21 (D. 
N.J. Mar. 26, 2009). 
 143. See N.Y. Civ. Rights L. § 79-n (McKinney 2015) (providing that a person who suffers 
damages to property, physical injury, or death “in whole or in substantial part” because of a belief or 
perception on the part of a perpetrator regarding the victim’s race, color, national origin, ancestry, 
gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of 
whether the belief or perception is correct, may bring a civil action for injunctive relief, damages, or any 
other appropriate relief in law or equity against the person who “intentionally selects” the person or 
property for harm). 
 144. No. 017910/2011, (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty.). 
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responsive pleadings were filed, and a default judgment of $25,000 was 
eventually granted in Ms. Friedlander’s favor.145  
i. Tennessee 
In Tennessee, gender violence survivors have a civil cause of action 
for damages against their aggressors under the state’s malicious 
harassment statute.146 Despite the availability of a civil cause of action 
for gender violence survivors, no Tennessee case law addresses claims 
brought by such survivors under the malicious harassment statute. 
j. Vermont 
In Vermont, gender violence survivors have a civil cause of action 
against the individual who committed a gender-based bias crime.147 
Vermont case law has not yet addressed gender violence survivors’ civil 
claims against their aggressors under the state’s bias-motivated crime 
statute. 
k. Washington 
In Washington, in addition to a criminal penalty,148 gender-violence 
survivors have a civil cause of action for damages against their 
aggressors under the state’s malicious harassment statute.149 Despite the 
 
 145. See Friedlander v. Waroge Met, Ltd. d/b/a/ Sizzler, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/friedlander-v-waroge-met (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); Court 
orders Sizzler to pay assault victim, THE TIMES LEDGER (June 20, 2012, 7:25 PM), 
http://www.timesledger.com/stories/2012/25/sizzlerbeatdownsettle_fh_2012_06_21_q.html. 
 146. See Tenn. Stat. § 4-21-701 (2017) (providing for a civil cause of action for malicious 
harassment, for both special and general damages, including damages for emotional distress, reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs, and punitive damages). See Washington v. Robertson Cty., 29 S.W.3d 466, 
471 (Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that claims of malicious harassment are “found within the Tennessee 
Human Rights Act, which, in general, addresses discrimination based on race, . . . sex, gender[.]”). 
 147. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1457 (2014) (providing civil cause of action for injunctive relief, 
compensatory and punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, and other appropriate relief, 
“[i]ndependent of any criminal prosecution or [its] result[s]” against perpetrator of bias crime). Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 13, § 1455 (2014) prohibits bias-motivated offenses and specifies criminal liability for crimes 
“maliciously motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
ancestry, age, service in the U.S. Armed Forces, disability[,] . . . sexual orientation or gender identity[.]” 
In addition, the Attorney General may seek a civil penalty of up to $5,000.00, plus costs and reasonable 
attorney’s fees for violation of the state’s bias crime laws. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1466 (2017). 
 148. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.080 (2010) (providing, inter alia, that a person is guilty 
of malicious harassment if “he or she maliciously and intentionally” causes physical injury or damage, 
or threatens a specific person or group, because of his or her perception of the victim’s race, color, 
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap). 
 149. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.083 (2017) (providing a civil cause of action for 
malicious harassment against the harasser for actual damages, punitive damages of up to ten thousand 
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availability of a civil cause of action for gender-violence survivors, no 
Washington case law addresses claims brought by survivors under this 
statute. 
l. Washington, D.C. 
 Washington, D.C. provides a civil remedy to persons incurring an 
injury based on an act that demonstrates the accused’s prejudice based 
on gender, among other protected categories.
150
 The sole reported 
decision applying the civil remedy denied the claim for lacking any 
allegations of bias-based criminal activity.
151
 
2. Private right of action for interference with state or federal 
rights, including right to be free from gender-based violence. 
a. Maine 
Maine provides a private right of action for violence or the threat of 
violence that interferes with a person’s rights under state or federal 
constitutional or statutory laws.152 In sum, this law establishes a civil 
cause of action for any person whose state and federal constitutional and 
statutory rights have been intentionally interfered with through actual or 
threatened violence, damage, destruction of property, or trespass. A 
gender-violence survivor bringing a civil claim under Maine’s civil 
action statute may seek an injunction, restraining order, and other 
 
dollars, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing the action). 
 150. See D.C. Code §22-3704 (2009) (providing, inter alia, a civil cause of action “[i]rrespective 
of any criminal prosecution or the result of a criminal prosecution,” to a person who incurs injury as a 
result of an intentional act that demonstrates an accused’s prejudice based on the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, 
gender identity or expression, family responsibilities, homelessness, physical disability, matriculation, 
or political affiliation of a victim, and providing for actual or nominal damages, including damages for 
emotional distress, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and injunctive relief). See also D.C. 
Code § 22-3703 (criminal sentencing enhancements for bias crimes); Shepherd v. United States, 905 
A.2d 260, 263 (D.C. 2006) (not construing the civil remedy, but holding that for the bias crime 
sentencing enhancement to apply, the assault had to be based on “the actual or perceived sexual 
orientation . . . of the victim” and as applied to the facts of this case appellant’s animus against his 
victims’ sexual orientation was evident). 
 151. See Uzoukwu v. Metro. Wash. Council of Gov’ts, 983 F. Supp. 2d 67, 94-96 (D.C. 2013) 
(declining to exercise jurisdiction over § 22-3704 claim as to certain defendants and separately holding 
that plaintiff failed to allege any facts indicating bias-based criminal activity against council). 
 152. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4682 (2014) (providing private right of action against individuals who 
intentionally interfere or attempt to intentionally interfere “by physical force or violence against a 
person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property or by the threat of physical force or 
violence against a person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property,” of a person whose 
rights are secured by the US Constitution or federal law, or rights secured by the Maine Constitution or 
state law for legal or equitable relief). 
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equitable and legal relief.153 Plaintiffs also have a right to jury trial, 
except for hearings regarding preliminary injunctions or temporary 
restraining orders.154 The two reported decisions interpreting this 
provision have rejected claims based on the absence of cognizable 
allegations.155 
b. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts’ Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) authorizes civil damages 
for bias-motivated threats, intimidation, and coercion that interfere with 
civil rights.156 A number of decisions have been brought based on 
harassment and assault in the workplace. Although Massachusetts’ 
workers’ compensation statute precludes a claim in tort for sexual 
assault and rape,157 survivors have successfully brought claims arising 
from sexual assaults and batteries that violate the employee’s civil 
rights.  
For example, in O’Connell v. Chasdi, an employee brought civil 
rights claims as well as claims of assault, battery, and intentional 
inflection of emotional distress against her employer based on a fellow 
employee’s sexual harassment on a business trip.158 The Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts reversed a judgment in favor of the defendants on the 
MCRA claim and found the sexual harassment claim was cognizable 
under the MCRA. Similarly, in Wood v. U.S., the court upheld a 
plaintiff’s MCRA claim for sexual harassment by an Army major she 
worked for as a secretary.159 In Rinsky v. Boston University, the plaintiff 
 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Fed. Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29, 32 (D. Me. 1995) (granting 
defendants’ motion to dismiss in case alleging that job applicant was rejected for a permanent position 
because of her gender and also in retaliation with regard to charges she had filed alleging sexual 
harassment, concluding that to prevail, a plaintiff “must at a minimum identify a threat of force or 
violence”); Curtis v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., No. 05-130-P-H, 2006 WL 662395, **10-11 (D. Me. 
Mar. 13, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim alleging harassment and concluding that allegations that Plaintiff was teased about the 
length of his hair by his coworkers were insufficient to sustain a claim).  
 156. M.G.L.A. 12 §§ 11H, I, J (2014). Massachusetts civil rights law prohibits, among other 
things, bias based on gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation. See, e.g., M.G.L.A. ch. 93 § 102 
(providing equal rights to, inter alia, contract, inheritance, convey real estate, to sue and be sued, and 
“to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property” based 
on, e.g., “sex”). Massachusetts also provides civil remedies as well as sentence enhancement for 
criminal penalties for bias crimes based, inter alia, on gender identity. See M.G.L.A. ch. 265 § 39 
(2014) (providing for sentence enhancement); M.G.L.A. ch. 266 § 127B (2014) (authorizing civil claims 
for violations of section 39). 
 157. See Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 566 (1996). 
 158. 400 Mass. 686 (1987). 
 159. 760 F. Supp. 952 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1993) (en 
banc). 
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also asserted assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and a claim under the MCRA based on sexual harassment by a 
client while working for her employer as a social work intern.160 The 
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the MCRA claim, 
finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled allegations showing that 
the defendants threatened, intimidated, or coerced the plaintiff into 
continuing to subject herself to constant sexual harassment from her 
client. 
c. New York 
New York State’s anti-discrimination statute prohibits discrimination 
and harassment based on sex, as well as race, creed, color, national 
origin, marital status, sexual orientation or disability.161 This statute 
applies the broad anti-discrimination principle to contexts not explicitly 
covered by other statutory provisions.162 A federal district court upheld 
claims that a high school student and his sister were subjected to 
harassment and discrimination based on the student’s sexual 
orientation.163 The only other decision invoking this law to address 
gender violence dismissed the claim.164 
d. North Carolina 
 In North Carolina, a gender-violence survivor has a civil cause of 
action against the aggressor only when the aggressor’s conduct was a 
part of a gender-motivated conspiracy of two or more persons to 
interfere with the survivor’s constitutional rights and the conduct 
“interfere[d], or [was] an attempt to interfere” with the survivor’s 
exercise or enjoyment of such rights.165 To prove a conspiracy, a 
survivor must show (1) an agreement to commit a crime or wrongful act, 
 
 160. No. 10cv10779-NG, 2010 WL 5437289, *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2010). 
 161. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c (2018).  
 162. See Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472-73 (N.Y. Sup. 1050) (applying civil rights 
statute to discrimination by labor unions notwithstanding lack of explicit prohibition of sex 
discrimination in applicable statute). 
 163. Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 164. See Caballero v. First Albany Corp. 654 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (3d Dep’t 1997) (rejecting claims 
of sex harassment and discrimination when plaintiff’s own affidavit stated that the cause of her 
workplace difficulties was her complaints about smoking).  
 165. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 99D-1(a)-(b) (2014) (providing, inter alia, for civil cause of 
action and providing for compensatory and punitive damages, court costs and attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party, with the provision that a prevailing defendant may be awarded reasonable attorneys’ 
[sic] fees only upon a showing that the case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation). The 
North Carolina Human Relations Commission may also bring a civil action on behalf of any gender-
violence survivor, subject to his or her consent. Id. at § 99D-1(b)(1).  
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(2) the alleged conspirators’ wrongful acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy and pursuant to a common scheme, and (3) a resultant 
injury.166  
North Carolina case law addressing claims brought by gender-
violence survivors against their aggressors is limited. One decision held 
that in order to sustain a claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove the 
defendant’s intent to interfere with his or her constitutional right.167 
However, in Zenobile v. McKecuen, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state an 
interference-with-civil-rights claim based on the plaintiff’s “civil rights 
as a woman.”168 The court recognized that the defendants conspired to 
render the plaintiff physically helpless, stripped her naked, and filmed 
her. They also destroyed evidence and harassed the plaintiff in an 
attempt to make her drop the investigation.169  
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
As this review demonstrates, state civil rights remedies provide tools 
to hold those who commit sexual violence accountable. They can apply 
to cases of workplace sexual violence, since Title VII has been 
interpreted not to apply to individuals.170 They can also hold those who 
commit sexual and other forms of gender violence accountable in the 
myriad other settings in which sexual violence causes economic, 
psychological, and other harms to its targets. These laws can provide 
relief for those who do not wish to engage with, or those who have not 
been afforded relief through, the criminal justice system, although 
engaging with the criminal justice system would not bar a civil claim.171 
Yet the survey also reveals the relative dearth of reported decisions 
 
 166. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 666 S.E.2d 107, 115 
(N.C. 2008). The aggressor’s prohibited conduct may include “use [of] force, repeated harassment, 
violence, physical harm to persons or property, or direct or indirect threats of physical harm to persons 
or property to commit an act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 
99D-1(a)(2) (2017). 
 167. For example, in Alexander v. Diversified Ace Servs. II, Luanesha Alexander, an employee of 
Diversified Ace Services II, brought a civil action alleging sexual harassment and gender-based violence 
as well as allegations of a conspiracy to “interfere with” her right to work in an environment “free of 
sexually abusive and discriminatory conduct”. No. 1:11CV725, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, *2-4, 31-
33 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2014). The court rejected the claim for failure to “sufficiently identif[y]” the 
survivor’s constitutional right that the aggressor had conspired to violate. Id. at *33-38. 
 168. 548 S.E.2d 756, 760 (N.C. App. 2001).  
 169. Id.  
 170. See supra note 3. 
 171. Notably, a number of the statutes enacted as part of their state’s “bias-crime” laws explicitly 
provide a civil cause of action regardless of whether the case led to a criminal prosecution or conviction. 
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-3704 (2018); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-7.1(c) (2018); Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 750.147b(3) (2018); Minn. Stat. § 611A.79(3) (2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13 § 1457 (2018). 
28
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/5
2018] CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES FOR GENDER VIOLENCE 199 
 
interpreting those laws. Some of the reported decisions interpret 
procedural issues, such as the statute of limitations or whether the suit 
was precluded by the state’s employment discrimination law, and do not 
shed much light on their substance.172 Importantly, a number of 
decisions easily recognize that allegations of sexual assault, or 
comments and epithets reflecting gender bias, stated a claim.173 By 
contrast, other decisions dismissed claims for failing to adequately 
allege a predicate act of violence sufficient to satisfy the statute.174 This 
case law suggests that statutes seeking to fill gaps and provide relief for 
gender-based violence define the predicate act broadly to capture the 
range of acts or series of acts that are the basis for gender-based 
violence and intimidation. 
Although suits seeking individual liability may not be a feasible 
strategy in all cases,175 they remain a critical component of a 
comprehensive accountability scheme. At least some of the barriers to 
private suits against individuals in tort law do not apply since, for 
example, most of these laws provide attorneys’ fees to the prevailing 
party.176 Moreover, these laws hold transformative power to shift norms 
 
 172. For cases dismissing claims based on, inter alia, a conclusion that the predicate acts fell 
outside the applicable statute of limitations, see, e.g., Adams v. Jenkins, No. 115745/03, 2005 WL 
6584554, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005); Cordero v. Epstein, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. 2008); Gottwald 
v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5202 (N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016). For cases concluding 
that workplace sexual harassment claims must be brought under state antidiscrimination laws, see Doe 
v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563 (1996). 
 173. See, e.g., F.P. v. Monier, 405 P.3d 1076 (Cal. 2017); Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-
0582 AG CWX, 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009); Smith v. Farmstand, No. 11-CV-9147, 
2016 WL 5912886 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016); Zamudio v. Nick & Howard LLC, No. 15 C 3917, 2015 
WL 6736679 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2015); Flores v. Santiago, 986 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Johnson 
v. David, No. 12-CV-1038-SCW, 2017 WL 1090811 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2017); Myers v. City and Cty. 
of San Francisco, No. C 08-1163 MEJ, 2012 WL 4111912 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012); Hern v. McEllen, 
No. A125358, 2011 WL 2112538 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 2011); O’Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686 
(1987); Wood v. U.S., 760 F. Supp. 952 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1122 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (en banc); Rinsky v. Boston University, No. 10cv10779-NG, 2010 WL 5437289 (D. Mass. 
Dec. 27, 2010); but cf, e.g., Gottwald, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5202 (finding insufficient allegations of 
gender-motivation); Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(finding the same). 
 174. See, e.g., Monier, 405 P.3d 1076; Harper v. Lugbauer, No. 11-CV-01306-JST, 2014 WL 
1266305 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014), aff'd, 709 F. App'x 849 (9th Cir. 2017); Greenwald v. Bohemian 
Club, Inc., No. C 07-05261 WHA, 2008 WL 2331947 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008); Ramirez v. Wong, 188 
Cal. App. 4th 1480 (2010); Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1268 (2017); Caldwell v. 
Fed. Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29 (D. Me. 1995). 
 175. See Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3, at 768-70 (explaining that suits against 
individuals may be less frequently made than those against institutions due to, inter alia, defendants’ 
limited financial resources, survivors’ lack of interest in re-engaging with an abuser, lack of access to 
counsel). 
 176. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b), 52.4(a) (2015); D.C. Code §22-3704 (2009); 740 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 82/15 (2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12—7.1(c) (1995); 5 M.R.S.A. § 4683 (2018) 
(Maine); M.G.L.A. ch. 12 § 11H (2014) (Massachusetts’ civil rights act); Mich. Comp. Laws § 
750.147b(3)(b) (2018); Neb. Rev. St. § 28-113(1) (2018); N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-21(d)(1) (2015); N.Y. 
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by framing gender violence in terms of civil rights, rather than private, 
individualized harm.177  
The recent rise in visibility of sexual abuse by individuals holding 
powerful positions highlights the importance of creating meaningful 
legal schemes for accountability and of framing sexual and other forms 
of gender-based violence as the civil rights violations that they are. State 
civil rights remedies can be more widely used to redress harm and 
advance accountability–they should not be overlooked as we advance 
legal and social change to promote equality, dignity, and justice for all.  
  
 
Civ. Rights L. § 79-N (4) (2014); N.Y.C. Admin. Code Tit. 8, Ch. 9 § 8-904 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 99D-1(a)-(b) (2014); Rockland Cty. Admin. Code 279-4(A)(3) (2001); Tenn. Stat. § 4-21-701 
(2017); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1457 (2014); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.083 (2017); Westchester 
County, NY., Code of Ordinances § 701.01 (2001).  
 177. Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3, at 756-67. 
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